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RULING ON DEIURRER TO PETITION FOR ANNILMENT
OF MARRIAGE*
This proceeding is quite unusual. Both parties are petitioners yet
neither is specifically either a plaintiff or defendant. No summons was
issued. Both parties are represented by the same learned counsel.
The prosecutor has appeared on behalf of the State and has filed a
demurrer for insufficient facts on behalf of the defendant.
The petition is one to annul a marriage entered into between
the parties; the petition recites that Henry R. Steinkuhler is past 66
years of age, and Elizabeth P. Steinkuhler is ten years younger; that
said Steinkuhler had been married to a former wife, Elsie, who while
in a state of mania due to the menopause, had sued for and obtained a
divorce,which proceeding was "regular, proper and valid;" that such
mania " in due time passed away;" that the petitioners intermarried
September 2, 1913, but later learned that the affections and family ties
between said Elsie and Henry had not been eradicated, and that (with
their study of the Bible) petitioners were both convinced they were
violating the law by living together as man and wife, whereupon, three
years ago, they separated. Wherefore they ask an annulment of their
marriage contract and her former name Bowman be restored.
Some marriages are void and other voidable. The former need
no annulment proceeding (except to make a record) ; the latter are
binding until annulled. Still others are valid, incapable of being
annulled, but terminated only by divorce.
Marriage creates a social status wherein not alone the parties but
the State is interested; Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, 95
Am St 609, 43 L R A 92, 3 Amer Rul Cas 252. Marriage differs from
other civil contracts in that it is not revocable at the will or consent
of the parties; Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Uthah 129, 95 Am St 821, 58
L R A 723. It has always been a matter of legislative control; Maynard v. Hill, 125 U S 190; Grigby v. Duket, 90 Wis 272, 48 Am St 928,
31 L R A 515.
Although a valid marriage can not be entered into by one whose
divorce from a former spouse is invalid (Collins v. Voorhees 47 N J Eq
315, 24 Am St 412, 14 L R A 366, 3 Amer iRul Cas 139) it will be noted
the petition in the case at bar expressly says the decree divorcing Elsie
from Henry was "regular, proper and valid." As between a former
and a subsequent marriage all the presumptions favor the latter; in re
Sloan, 50 Wash 86, 17 L R A ns 960; including the presumption that
such former marriage was legally dissolved, Schaffer v. Ricl ardsol,
125 Ind 88, L R A 1915 E, 186 (annot). We have then in this case a
*This is a ruling on demurrer by Judge Moll in In Re Marriage of Henry
R. Steinkuhler and Elizabeth P. Bowman, Superior CT. No. 35298. It gives
a judicial pronouncement in a most unusual legal action.
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valid divorce between Henry and Elsie and a subsequent valid marriage between Henry and Elizabeth, petitioners.
Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blkfd 407 1831) 21 Am Dee 742 contains a
valuable historical discussion the dissoluiton of the marriage relation
by consent, by legislation and by decree. Petitioners rely on the
former, and demurrant insists on the latter, and insists further the
petition is insufficient on that score. In the Tolen case, supra, it is
said (p 408) "Divorces are of two kinds, a mensa, et thoro, and a
vine do; and the causes of divorce are as different as there are different
states and governments. By the civil law, either party might renounce
the marriage union at pleasure. Justinian for a short time abolished
divorces, but was compelled to revive them again. He restored the
unlimited freedom of divorce, and gave as a reason that the hatred,
misery and crimes, which often flowed from indissoluble connections,
required that marriage should be subject to dissolution by mutual will
and consent. By the ecclesiastical law, a marriage may be dissolved
and declared void ab initio, for canonical impediments existing previous to marriage. In the Roman Catholic States heretofore, divorces
were not allowed, because marriage was considered by them a sacrament and indissoluble. The Napoleon Code admits of divorce for
several named causes to be pronounced by the tribunals, where the
parties can not agree on a dissolution, and in all cases where the parties agree thereto. In England a divorce a vivcido is seldom granted
except for adultery, but divoces a mensa et tMoro are very common and
often for very trifling causes. In some of our states, divorces a vinetdo
are restrained by constitutional provisions, which require the assent of
two thirds of the legislature founded on previous judicial investigation. In some, divorces are granted solely by special acts of the legislature; in others, divorces a vinculo are judicially granted for adultery
only; and in others, not only for adultery but also for ill treatment,
abuse, abandonment, and many other causes. In our state, divorces a
vinculo only are granted; a divorce a medusa. et thoro is not authorized"
Legislative divorce were granted in Indiana in territorial days. Since
1903, limited divorces may be decreed. The inference in the Toleni
Case, that a marriage valid (or even voidable) when entered into can
be dissolved only by judicial decree based on some statutory ground,
has never been questioned, modified or departed from. "An action
for divorce is brought for the purpose of dissolving a marriage; while
a nullity suit is brought for the purpose of having a void marriage
declared void, or a voidable marriage judicially made void. In the
divorce suit the marriage is recognized as valid and adjudged to be
dissolved from the date of the decree, but in the nullity suit the marriage is not recognized, but is adjudged void, that is, that there was no
marriage, and the rights of the parties are the same as if the marriage
had never taken place." Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind 287, 298, 32
Tj R A AIR. Thp court at p. 300 distinguishes Bishop v. Redmoizd, 83
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Ind 157, by saying the complaint there "did not state any statutory
cause for divorce, but did state facts sufficient to entitle appellee to a
decree of nullity on the ground of fraud. It was only upon this theory
that the action of the trial court could be sustained." In the case at
bar no statutory grounds for divorce are averred, in truth, a divorce is
not sought. "The right to a divorce exists only by legislative grant,
the marriage contract in this respect being regulated and controlled by
the sovereign power, and not being like ordinary contract subject to
dissolution by mutual consent of the contracting parties, but only for
causes sanctioned by the law." 9 R C L 252, citing many leading cases,
among them MaynarZ v. Hil, supra.
No decree of nullity can be entered upon the mere consent of the
parties of record, because they can not bind the public; there must be
a complaint in due form for a cause authorized by law. Sickles v. Carson, 26 N J Eq 440; Blott v. Rider, 47 How. Pr. (BY) 90.
We conclude the complaint is insufficient because:
1. It shows affirmatively a legal divorce between Henry and Elsie;
2. It shows affirmatively a legal marriage between Henry and
Elizabeth;
It shows no cause existing at or since their marriage justifying a
dissolution, either by annulment or divorce;
4. Consent of the parties is not sufficient.
The demurrer is sustained, with exceptions to both petitioners.
TmEoPmImus J. MomJ
Judge of the Superior Court, Marion County.

